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Abstract—As a consequence of maturing technologies and 
regulatory interventions, wind power producers (WPPs) are 
likely to participate strategically in competitive electricity 
markets. In wind dominated oligopolistic electricity markets, 
strategic WPPs would optimize their offering bids considering 
rival behavior. In this perspective, stochastic equilibrium 
problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) model is 
proposed, to develop optimal offering strategy for WPPs that 
participate as price-makers in day-ahead electricity market and 
as price takers in balancing market. Strategic behavior of such 
WPPs is modeled using bi-level model that can be recast as 
stochastic mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints 
(MPEC). In the bi-level model, upper-level represents profit 
maximization problem of WPPs, while lower-level represents 
market clearing problem of independent system operator (ISO). 
Wind power and balancing market price uncertainties are 
modeled through scenarios. MPECs of all strategic WPPs are 
solved simultaneously using diagonalisation. Realistic case 
studies are simulated to show effectiveness of the proposed 
approach. Obtained results show that proposed approach can 
increase WPPs’ profits significantly.  
Index Terms— Electricity Markets, Nash Equilibrium, 
Mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), 
Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), 
Wind Power. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electrical power industry is being restructured throughout the 
world to improve system efficiency and offer economic 
solutions. At same time, uncertainty of fossil fuel prices and 
environmental concerns are enhancing quantum of renewable 
power generation. Among the renewable generation, wind 
power is growing rapidly due to its maturing technology and 
widespread availability. Wind power integration into power 
systems causes various operational issues due to its 
generation variability. Despite these difficulties, penetration 
of wind power in electricity markets is increasing 
significantly over the last couple of decades due to regulatory 
and fiscal interventions from the governments [1].  
Over these years, wind power producers (WPPs) are slowly 
treading towards a dominant position in electricity 
generation. As they grow in dominance, and with nominal 
marginal cost of generation, they are likely to sustain in the 
market without any regulatory support. They would be 
interested to participate in evolving pool based electricity 
markets, similar to conventional generators. Evolving 
electricity markets are primarily designed for conventional 
generators, working in day-ahead and balancing market 
framework. In day-ahead electricity markets, participants 
must submit bids several hours before actual power delivery. 
Real-time balance between generation and demand is 
managed by balancing market, and cleared few minutes 
before actual operation. Deviation from the committed 
generation attracts imbalance penalties to the participant from 
ISO. Due to randomness of wind power availability, actual 
power delivered by WPPs can differ significantly from their 
committed generation, leading to high imbalance penalties in 
pool based electricity markets.  
Due to high imbalance penalties and generation 
uncertainty, trading wind power in pool based electricity 
markets is a challenging decision-making problem and 
researchers have attempted to tackle this by a variety of 
approaches. Markov probability and stochastic programming 
approach have been used to determine the optimal contracted 
energy level of WPPs considering wind and imbalance price 
uncertainties [2], [3]. Probabilistic forecasting has been 
employed to help WPPs formulate optimal offers with 
minimum imbalance cost [4]. Multistage stochastic 
programming approach suggests various trading floors to 
derive the best offering strategy for a wind power producer 
[5]. A stochastic model has been proposed to formulate 
optimal bids of WPPs in LMP based day-ahead electricity 
markets considering risk of their profit variability [6]. 
Considering rival behavior, WPPs can trade their energy 
optimally in day-ahead and balancing electricity market 
through combined stochastic programming and game theory 
approach [7]. In the above discussed studies, WPPs are 
considered as price-takers, and focus on imbalance cost 
minimization to maximize their profits.  
Growing penetration of wind power in electricity markets 
is likely to offer opportunities for WPPs to behave as price-
makers. Therefore, to maximize the profits, they would focus 
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on offering strategies to affect market-clearing prices. With a 
price-maker’s perspective, WPPs can develop optimal 
offering strategy in both day-ahead and balancing markets 
using MPEC approach [8], [9]. MPEC approach has been 
applied for modeling individual behavior of strategic power 
producer in electricity markets, but this approach is unable to 
model strategic behavior of multiple power producers. 
However, consideration of multiple strategic power producers 
is significant, as the electricity markets are practically 
oligopolistic in nature. Modeling for multiple strategic power 
producers to understand the impact of rival behavior on their 
strategy, is yet to be visualized in the MPEC approach. 
Interaction between multiple strategic power producers is 
generally modeled using game theoretical or equilibrium 
model as EPEC. Bertrand model based duopoly competition 
between strategic conventional power producers consisting 
WPP as a part of their portfolio has been discussed in [10]. 
Cournot based oligopolistic competition between independent 
strategic WPPs has been discussed in [11].  
This paper develops offering strategy of WPPs that 
participate as price-maker in day-ahead electricity markets, 
and as price-taker in balancing market. Strategic behavior of 
each WPP is modeled using bi-level model. In a bi-level 
model, upper-level represents profit maximization problem of 
strategic WPPs, while lower-level represents ISO market 
clearing problem. Uncertainties involved in wind power and 
balancing market price are modeled through scenarios. 
Bilevel model can be recast as MPEC by transposing market-
clearing problem into its optimal conditions using Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) approach. Since MPECs of all WPPs is 
simultaneously solved using diagonalization method, 
proposed model is equivalent to EPEC. Proposed model have 
following advantages: 1) WPPs independently compete in 
electricity markets rather than being a part of conventional 
power producer’s portfolio. 2) Both price and quantity are 
decision variables, closely reflecting realistic electricity 
markets.     
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
A. Market Structure  
Strategic WPPs can participate in pool based network 
constrained day-ahead electricity market by submitting their 
offers in advance. Real-time balance between supply and 
demand is maintained by balancing market. WPPs can 
sell/buy their excess/deficit generation in balancing markets. 
After receiving offers from all participants, ISO clears the 
market to provide locational marginal price (LMP) at each 
bus and scheduled generation of each participants. LMP at 
each bus is obtained as dual variable associated with power 
balance constraint for this bus in market clearing problem. 
WPPs can earn their revenue according to LMP of the 
particular bus where they are located. Balancing market price 
is uniform at all buses. This framework is commonly 
practiced in several electricity markets. 
B. Uncertainty Characterization 
Uncertainty associated with wind power generation and 
balancing market prices are represented through scenarios. 
Scenarios are possible outcomes of random input, with 
corresponding occurrence probability. For scenario 
generation, time series based autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) model is used. Generated wind 
speed scenarios are converted into power scenarios, using 
power curve of corresponding wind turbines installed by 
WPPs. For accurate representation of any stochastic process, 
a large number of scenarios are required. Due to 
computational complexity and time limitations, generated 
scenarios need to be reduced. The present work does not aim 
to propose any model to generate accurate scenarios, and uses 
algorithm from [10] to reduce wind power and balancing 
market price scenarios. The reduced scenarios reflect the 
generated power of WPPs and balancing market prices.   
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
This section provides mathematical formulation of 
proposed stochastic EPEC model, along with its solution 
procedure. 
A. Wind Power Producers Problem 
Energy-trading problem of strategic WPPs can be 
formulated mathematically as follows: 
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Where, ,iP  and 
bm
 are generated wind power and 
balancing market in scenario with occurrence 
probability prob . Objective function (1) represents profit of 
thi strategic WPP, considering balancing cost/income under 
the assumption that wind power generation cost is zero; 
therefore, expected payoff is equal to expected profit. 
Optimization problem (1) of each WPP includes set of 
variables  ,Oi i ix Pof .WPP revenue is calculated by 
multiplication of corresponding LMP dmn , where they are 
located in the system and their scheduled generation being 
provided by the ISO. Equality constraint (2) states that 
excess/deficit power ,iPb   to be sold/ purchased by WPPs 
must be equal to the difference between their cleared 
generation iPs  and wind power in each scenario. Constraint 
(3) states that sum of offered power and excess/deficit power 
must be less than or equal to installed capacity of WPP maxiP . 
Inequality constraint (4) and (5) states that offered 
power iPof and price iO must be greater than or equal to zero.         
B. Independent System Operator Problem 
After receiving bids from market participants, ISO with an 
aim to social welfare maximization, can solve market-
clearing problem to schedule market operation. The market-
clearing problem is convex and non-linear, due to product of 
WPPs’ offered price and cleared generation. The social 
welfare maximization problem can be formulated 
mathematically as follows:  
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Where, g , ,d l  and DF  are generators’ marginal cost, 
consumers’ utility cost and demand factor, respectively.  
Objective function (6) represents social welfare maximization 
problem comprising surplus of strategic WPPs, conventional 
generators and consumers.  The optimization problem of ISO 
consists of a set of primal variables 
 ,, , , ,g i d l n r ny P Ps P f  . The set of dual variables 
corresponding inequality constraints    m i n m a x, ,n r n r     
min max max min min max, ,, , , , ,d l d l g g n n       and equality 
constraints  1, ,dmn n r    . Dual variables corresponding 
to equality and inequality constraints are assigned to 
formulate MPEC, as discussed in next subsection. Equality 
constraint (7) ensures that sum of scheduled power of either 
wind iPs  or conventional generators gP , or both, at any 
particular bus must be equal to meet the demand and injected 
power at that bus. Constraint (8) states that power 
flow n rf  in a particular transmission line n r is equal to the 
product of corresponding susceptance n rB  and difference 
between voltage angle at sending n and receiving r bus of 
line. Inequality constraint (9) enforces the MW flow limit on 
transmission lines. Constraints (10), (11) and (12) impose 
upper and lower bounds on scheduled output of wind, 
conventional generators and demand. Upper bound is equal to 
offered bids while lower bound is assumed to be zero. 
Constraint (13) represents that voltage angle at network bus is 
within predefined limits. Constraint (14) represents that 
voltage angle at reference bus should be equal to zero.     
A. NLP based Stochastic MPEC Formulation 
The above discussed, strategic WPPs’ profit maximization 
and ISO’ market clearing problem can be written as a 
generalized bi-level problem.  
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Objective function (15) is defined in terms of WPPs’ 
decision variables and variables of lower-level problem. Eqs. 
(16) and (17) represent generalized form of equality and 
inequality constraints of strategic WPP’ profit maximization 
problem. Similarly, Eq. (18) represents generalized form of 
market clearing problem. During optimization of lower-level 
problem, variables of upper-level problem ix can act as 
parameters. Bi-level problem can be converted into single-
level problem, by transposing market-clearing problem into 
its optimal conditions using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
approach [13]. Converted single-level problem is equivalent 
to MPEC. MPEC can be represented mathematically as: 
     , , , 0y iso y iso y isof y x g y x h y x              (19) 
 , 0isog y x                                                                   (20) 
 0 , 0isoh y x                                                       (21) 
Eq. (19) represents necessary condition of lower-level 
problem, obtained by its partial differentiation with respect to 
primal variables.  Complementarity constraint (21) states that 
inequality constraints and corresponding dual variables are 
orthogonal to each other. These constraints can be handled 
easily by introducing slack variables.     
 , 0isoh y x s                                                              (22) 
0s                                                                                 (23) 
0                                                                                (24) 
0s                                                                         (25) 
Constraint (25) defines Hadamard product of dual and 
slack variable. Finally, MPEC for each strategic WPP can be 
formulated as: 
 
           
min 15
subject to
16 , 17 , 19 , 20 , 22 25
                                   (26) 
B.   Stochastic EPEC Formulation 
Each strategic WPP has its own MPEC, as described in the 
previous section. MPEC (26) of each strategic WPP is solved 
simultaneously, and can be represented by EPEC as: 
w
iMPEC i                                                           (27)     
Traditional diagonalization is adopted to solve EPEC (27). 
The proposed simulation procedure is described in the next 
section.  
C. Simulation Procedure 
This section details the simulation procedure used to solve 
the proposed model.  
Step 1: Uncertainty characterization: Initialize the strategic 
WPPs’ generated power and balancing market prices 
through scenarios. For scenario generation and 
reduction, algorithm from [12] is used.  
Step 2: Iteration counter and convergence tolerance 
initialization: Initialize iteration counter K and 
convergence tolerance  to solve MPECs. Iteration 
counter starts with 1k   and convergence tolerance is 
defined as 0  .  
Step 3: Starting point initialization: Initialize starting strategy 
vector  (0) (0) (0)(0) 1 2, ,.... ix x x x  of each strategic 
WPP at iteration counter 0k  .  
Step 4: Solve MPEC: For current iteration, MPEC (26) of 
each strategic WPP can be solved one by one as 
follows: when 1MPEC  is being solved, then strategy 
vectors of 2 ,...... iMPEC MPEC  are kept fix and when 
2MPEC  is being solved, strategy vectors of 
1 3, ,...,MPECiMPEC MPEC  are kept fix and so on.  
Step 5: Check iteration counter: When strategy vector of each 
MPEC satisfy the stopping criterion 
( 1) (k)k
i ix x 

  , go to next step, otherwise update 
iteration counter by one and repeat pervious step. 
Else, for k K , stop and display output as “Nash 
equilibrium solution not found”. 
Step 6: End 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The proposed approach is illustrated by simulating 
different test cases on IEEE Reliability Test system, with 24 
buses, 32 generating units, 17 demand and 38 transmission 
lines. For the sake of clarity on results, the installed capacity 
of generating units is assumed double and demand is assumed 
fifty percent higher than that reflected in corresponding 
Tables 7 and 5 of [14]. Demand is assumed elastic up to 10 
percent. The range of demand prices offered lie within 40 to 
120 $/MWh. Three strategic wind power producers WPP1, 
WPP2 and WPP3 are considered connected at buses 22, 18 
and 7 respectively. Installed capacity of producers WPP1, 
WPP2 and WPP3 is considered to be 300 MW, 400 MW and 
600 MW, respectively. According to system configuration 
location and capacity of WPPs is analytically selected. The 
selection of both location and capacity would affect the 
network congestion as well as offering strategy of WPPs. 
WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 are considered located at 
Beardstown, Carroll and Champaign, USA respectively. Each 
WPP has commercial 2.5 MW, ENERCON E-115 turbines 
installed at 139 m hub height. Number of installed turbines 
for each WPP is varied to reflect their capacity. Air density 
and temperature conditions are assumed same for each 
installed wind turbine. The used turbine model and its power 
curve are detailed in manufacturer database [15]. For all 
WPPs, actual wind speed data through January to June 2007 
is considered, publically available at Illinois Institute of Rural 
Affair, USA [16]. Historical data of PJM balancing market is 
considered [17]. 
Uncertainty of wind power availability and balancing 
market prices are characterized through scenarios generated 
using ARIMA model. The estimated parameters [i.e. model 
order, autoregressive (AR) coefficient, moving average (MA) 
coefficient, variance of white noise (sigma)] of ARIMA 
model are shown in Table I. For accurate modeling of 
uncertainties, 5000 scenarios are generated and then reduced 
to 20 representative scenarios. 
TABLE I 
ARIMA MODEL PARAMETERS 
Parameters WPP1 WPP2 WPP3 Balancing market price 
Order (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (2,1,2) (1,1,1) 
AR1 -0.506 -0.410 0.687 0.748 
AR2 - - 0.222 0.991 
MA1 -0.585 -0.500 0.600 - 
MA2 - - 0.400 - 
Variance 0.936 0.952 0.526 0.959 
 
In order to compare proposed approach, following test 
cases are considered.  
Case I: Base Case: In this case, WPPs are considered non-
strategic or price-takers. They offer their expected 
generation at zero price to day-ahead electricity 
market. ISO clears the market by solving market 
clearing problem (6)-(14), to provide cleared 
generation and LMP at each bus. WPPs can calculate 
their expected revenue according to their cleared 
generation and corresponding LMP. For each 
scenario, balancing market income/cost of WPPs is 
calculated according their surplus/deficit generation 
and balancing market price.  
Case II: Single Strategic WPP: In this case, WPPs are 
considered price-makers, but at any given time only 
single WPP is active in day-ahead electricity market. 
Therefore, when particular WPPs behave 
strategically, other WPPs are assumed to behave non-
strategically. Offering strategy of WPPs is developed 
by solving their MPECs (26). Rival behavior is not 
considered in this case. 
Case III: Multiple Strategic WPPs: In this case, WPPs are 
considered price-maker and are active in day-ahead 
electricity market simultaneously. Strategic WPPs are 
required for the proposed EPEC approach (27) to 
develop their offering considering rival behavior. 
Above test cases are simulated on Windows based laptop 
has a 1.67 GHz, Intel Core 2 duo processor and 2.50 GB 
RAM. Simulation for scenario generation and reduction has 
been performed on MATLAB platform and MPEC is solved 
using KNITRO 8.0 solver in GAMS software [18]. 
A. Single Period Results 
For all considered test cases, the obtained results for first 
hour are shown in Table II. The demand factor for first hour 
is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
TABLE II 
BID PRICES ($/MW), BID QUANTITIES (MW), EXPECTED PROFIT ($), LMP 
($/MWH) FOR FIRST HOUR  
 Bids/profit Case I Case II Case III 
WPP1 
Price 0 48.91 25.35 
Quantity 105.31 172.76 150.47 
Profit 1270.77 1955.09 1998.66 
WPP2 
Price 0 45.22 25.34 
Quantity 54.55 225.37 295.66 
Profit 1536.71 2279.21 2452.47 
WPP3 
Price 0 46.06 60 
Quantity 195.03 324.71 437.72 
Profit 2147.32 2711.05 2548.96 
LMP - 40 
[54.56, 
45.22, 
46.06] 
60 
 
From Table II, it is visualized that offered quantity bids of 
WPPs increase in Cases II and III, as compared to the base 
case. Increment and decrement in offered bid quantity of 
WPPs depend on their expected generation and balancing 
market prices. WPPs expecting balancing market price to be 
higher than day-ahead market would decrease their offer 
quantity in day-ahead electricity market and vice-versa. 
WPPs’ offer prices in Cases II and III are equal to resulting 
LMP at the bus where they are located. Strategic WPPs can 
exercise their local market power capability and set LMP 
equal to their offered price. LMP is uniform for all buses 
without any network congestion.     
As compared to the base case, expected profits earned by 
strategic WPPs, WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 are respectively 
53.85 %, 48.31 % and 26.25% higher than in Case II. In Case 
III, strategic WPPs develop their strategy using proposed 
approach. In this case, profit of WPP1 and WPP2 increases 
while profit of WPP3 decreases, as compared to Case II. 
WPP3 is located at Bus 7, and is connected to the system only 
through a transmission line via Bus 8. Therefore, market 
power of WPP3 is not effective in the presence of other 
strategic power producers, unless other lines are congested.   
B. Multi Period Results 
For a multi-period application of proposed approach, 
considered test cases are simulated for IEEE 24 bus system. 
As wind power is not controllable, simulations for each hour 
are carried out independently. Demand MW bids are varied 
according to demand factor profile shown in Fig. 1.  
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Fig. 1.  Hourly demand factor (Source: Table 4, Column 4, [14]) 
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Fig. 2. Offered price bids of strategic WPPs in Case III 
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Fig. 3. Offered quantity bids of strategic WPPs in Case III 
 
Hourly price and quantity bids to be offered by WPPs are 
shown in Figs. 2 and 3 respectively.  Hourly profits earned by 
strategic WPPs are shown in Fig. 4. From these figures, it is 
visualized that power offered by strategic WPPs changes 
throughout the day. This is because of expected wind power 
generation and balancing market prices. In Hour 12 and last 
four hours, WPPs offer less power in the day-ahead market 
because in these hours balancing market prices are 
comparatively high. Therefore, WPPs try to sell their excess 
generation in balancing market, rather than managing deficit 
generation by purchasing at higher prices. During each hour, 
except for hours 4, 5, 20 and 21, at least two power producers 
are active in day-ahead electricity market. Strategic behavior 
of WPPs also depends on network configuration and local 
demand, therefore during these hours only single WPP is 
active, which sets the market prices equal to their offered 
price.       
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Fig. 4. Expected Profits of strategic WPPs in Case III  
 
Finally, to evaluate the impact of transmission congestion 
on daily profit earned by WPPs, considered test cases are 
simulated again for IEEE-24 bus system, by assuming 
transmission line capacity equal to half of that considered in 
the original case of [14]. Daily profit of WPPs considering 
uncongested and congested networks is shown in Table III. 
Form this it is visualized that profit of WPPs in Case I 
changes slightly. In Case II, expected profit of WPP1, WPP2 
and WPP3 increase by 4.8%, 1.66% and 9.94 % respectively, 
due to transmission congestion. Expected profit of all WPPs 
decreases slightly in Case III, due to transmission congestion. 
Due to increment/ decrement in expected profits of WPPs 
throughout the day, percentage change in their daily profit is 
less as compared to their hourly profit.  
 
TABLE III 
DAILY EXPECTED PROFIT ($) EARNED BY WPPS  
 Uncongested network 
 Case I Case II Case III 
WPP1 37953.74 44967.06 44796.49 
WPP2 54609.76 58165.61 64367.51 
WPP3 60949.62 63753.55 70652.73 
 Congested network 
WPP1 39496.33 47129.52 44163.31 
WPP2 53257.57 59133.19 60377.42 
WPP3 58065.03 70095.89 69530.32 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In oligopolistic day-ahead electricity markets, behavior of 
strategic WPPs is affected by rival behavior. Considering 
rival behavior, offering strategy of strategic WPPs has been 
formulated using proposed stochastic EPEC approach. 
Proposed approach has been illustrated through practical case 
studies. Based on the obtained results, it is concluded that 
profit of strategic WPP would increase unilaterally when it 
offers its generation strategically, while other power 
producers behave non-strategically. However, in the presence 
of multiple strategic power producers, no producer can 
increase its profit unilaterally. Applicability of proposed 
approach on daily planning horizon and impact of 
transmission congestion on WPPs’ strategies have been 
discussed. The proposed model can be improved by 
considering behavior of conventional generators and 
modeling demand uncertainty. Consideration of strategic 
behavior of wind power producers in intra-day and real-time 
markets are issues of further investigation.   
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